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ABSTRACT: Moral dissensus may arise first because persons may disagree over the warrants licensing 
inferring an evaluative conclusion from premises asserting that properties alleged evaluatively relevant 
hold. This results in seeing different properties as evaluatively relevant. Secondly, such  properties will 
frequently not be descriptive but interpretive, asserting some nomic connection. Persons may disagree over 
what evaluatively relevant properties hold in a given case. We explore the possibilities for argumentation to 
resolve these two types of disagreement. 
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JOHN: What people do between the sheets is their own business. 
JIM: You can’t mean that. You are saying that the sexual act has no meaning. 
 
Jim is presenting John with an argument. I see it as a reductio ad absurdum argument 
with an unstated premise, i.e. 
 
The sexual act has a meaning (and you, John, will admit it) 
 
and an unstated conclusion, 
 
John, what you are saying is wrong. 
 
How specifically does the reductio part of the argument proceed? John is making a 
deontic claim, asserting the generalization that 
 
All sexual acts are (morally) permissible. 
 
Assuming this premise conditionally, Jim then claims we can argue using the following 
warrant: 
 
Given that:  All sexual acts are morally permissible. 
One may take it that: The sexual act has no meaning. 
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How might Jim justify this warrant?1 
 
1. EVALUATION AND SUPERVENIENCE 
 
It is a commonplace philosophical position that deontic properties–and indeed evaluative 
properties in general–are supervenient. That is, something possesses a certain evaluative 
property because it possesses some further property. Two things relevantly similar in 
sharing these further properties will have the same evaluative property. Principles of 
supervenience may be expressed as Toulmin warrants. For example, 
 
Given that  x has promised to do Y 
One may take it that x has a duty to do Y 
 
Specifically, Jim is holding that for some class of properties X = {X1, X2, ..., Xi, ...},2 
warrants of the form 
 
Given that   Act A is Xi 
One may take it that Performing A in circumstances Y is not permissible  
 
are acceptable. A member of X, Xi expresses what we call an interpretive property–one 
that could be expressed through a universally generalized subjunctive conditional 
statement. For example 
 
X1: (œx)(œy) (if x and y were to perform A as partners, then  x and y would 
enter into the dialogue of generations) 
X2: (œx)(œy) (if x and y were to perform A as partners, then either x would feel 
degraded by y or y would feel degraded by x) 
 
Following Ross in (1930), we may take these warrants as expressing principles of prima 
facie impermissibility. So included in this class then are warrants such as 
 
Given that   A is X1 
One may take it that  Performing A in circumstances completely divorced from 
procreation is impermissible 
Given that  A is X2 
One may take it that Performing A in any circumstances is impermissible. 
 
Now if for a sexual act to have meaning is to have at least one of these interpretive 
properties, it following from John’s assertion that no sexual acts have meaning. 
                                                 
1 Since a warrant is an inference rule rather than a statement or proposition, talk of justifying a warrant may 
seem anomalous. But corresponding to a warrant is a conditional statement. In this case for our purposes, 
we may phrase the statement as “If all sexual acts are morally permissible, then no sexual acts have 
meaning.” To justify the corresponding conditional is to justify the warrant. 
2 We are leaving X open ended. We make no commitment as to whether X is finite or infinite. 
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 Jim’s argument is not yet complete, although he has advanced the discussion. 
John may yet remain unconvinced. There are at least two types of critical questions John 
could raise here for Jim’s argument. First, Jim has claimed that the warrants of 
supervenience of impermissibility upon certain interpretive properties are acceptable. 
John could challenge Jim to justify this acceptability. Secondly, John could ask Jim 
whether the impermissibility is prima facie or overriding. If Jim answers that the 
impermissibility is prima facie, John could grant that the warrants were acceptable, but 
that in each case the sexual act possessed some further deontically relevant property. Let 
us assume that it is some interpretive property so that the sexual act will have some 
additional meaning. John could further claim that this additional deontically relevant 
property outweighs the impermissibility-making interpretive property. Clearly, John is 
incurring a very significant burden of proof by making this claim. Given a property such 
as X2, it is difficult to see what permissibility-making property would outweigh it. 
However, this is a logically permissible move on John’s part. 
 By contrast, Jim could answer that X contained warrants of overriding 
impermissibility. Jim would then be incurring a significant burden of proof. But notice 
that Jim need not incur this burden of proof. He can allow that these warrants are 
principles of prima facie impermissibility, as long as he can construct a scenario into 
which both he and John can enter empathetically where some act A is Xi and Xi’s 
impermissibility making force is not outweighed by any other permissibility-relevant 
property. In that case, John would have to retract his claim that all sexual acts are morally 
permissible, resolving the immediate dissensus with Jim. (I say immediate, because John 
might subsequently follow his retraction by asserting another modified thesis from which 
Jim might dissent.) 
 This interchange between John and Jim indicates two focal points where moral 
dissensus may arise. First, persons may diverge over the warrants they accept or at least 
over those warrants which are salient for them. Thus they will diverge over the properties 
which they see as relevant to evaluations. Second, persons may diverge over their 
interpretations of a situation, at least over the interpretive properties which they accept 
hold in a given case. One person may see a given act as exhibiting features R1N, ..., RnN; 
W1N, ..., WmN, where the RiNare prima facie right-making properties and the WjN are prima 
facie wrong-making properties. They may see the WjNs as outweighing the RiNs. By 
contrast, a second person may see that same act as exhibiting features R1O, ..., RkO; W1O, 
..., WoO, where the right-making outweigh the wrong-making features. The first will 
judge the act wrong; the second, right. How may we bring the resources of argumentation 
theory to help resolve these two types of cases of dissensus, if possible? 
 
2. RESOLVING DISSENSUS OVER WARRANTS 
 
To begin, let us say that our analysis accepts Ross’s ethical intuitionism as put forward in 
(1930). As Ross distinguished between prima facie and outright, overriding, or absolute 
duties, so we may distinguish between prima facie and outright warrants. Being a prima 
facie duty, as opposed to a duty outright, is “being an act which would be a duty proper if 
it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant (Ross 1930, p. 
19).” This distinction between prima facie and outright holds for evaluative properties in 
general, at least for those ascribing deontic or intrinsic value. For example, we may speak 
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of an state of affairs as being prima facie intrinsically good, i.e. it would be good without 
qualification if it did not possess other properties relevant to its intrinsic value. Prima 
facie warrants, then, are inference rules licencing our inferring some prima facie 
evaluative property from some evaluatively relevant property, e.g. 
 
Given that  x has made a promise to do Y 
We may take it that  x has a prima facie duty to do Y 
 
 Ross believes that such prima facie warrants are self-evident. “To me it seems as 
self-evident as anything could be, that to make a promise ... is to create a moral claim on 
us in someone else. (1930, p. 21 footnote).” As we argued in (2005), following Ross, we 
see the recognition of this self-evidence involving two distinct but related belief-
generating mechanisms, moral sense and moral intuition. By moral sense, we recognize 
the prima facie rightness or obligatoriness of individual acts, e.g. where one has made a 
particular promise, one has a prima facie duty to keep it. But we may come to recognize 
that an act of promise keeping is prima facie right or a prima facie duty just because it is 
an instance of promise keeping. As Ross puts it, we are recognizing “that an act, qua 
fulfilling a promise, or qua effecting a just distribution of good, or qua returning services 
rendered, or qua promoting the good of others, or qua promoting the virtue or insight of 
the agent, is prima facie right (1930, p. 29).” But to recognize that of any act which is  N, 
qua being N it is prima facie right is just to recognize the generalized conditional 
corresponding to the warrant 
 
Given that   x is N 
We may take it that  x is prima facie right.  
 
 Now, as L. J. Cohen points out, intuition suggests “what is a reason for what 
(1986, p. 76).” So prima facie warrants and their corresponding conditionals are both 
cognized by moral intuition. What is significant here is that this apprehension is basic, 
not the conclusion of an argument from premises taken as more basic. The self-evidence 
of what is apprehended indicates furthermore that the apprehension is properly basic. Can 
then there be dissensus over prima facie moral (or more generally evaluative) warrants? I 
believe this is logically possible, but that such warrants are apprehended in a properly 
basic way has a distinct moral for how such dissensus should be resolved. One should not 
seek to argue for the associated conditional of the warrant. If one does not see that from 
an act’s being the fulfillment of a promise that one can infer that the act is a prima facie 
duty, presumably this is because one has not made promises or entered empathetically 
into situations where one has made a promise, or into situations where one has both made 
a promise and broken it without an attenuating excuse, or into situations where one has 
been made some promise and that promise has been broken. To resolve dissensus in such 
cases, one should seek to lead the dissenter to enter such situations empathetically, 
thereby intending to lead the dissenter into a situation where his moral sense and moral 
intuition may be exercised on relevant considerations. Through such exercises, we are 
leading the dissenter to “see the prima facie rightness of an act which would be the 
fulfillment of a particular promise, and of another which would be the fulfillment of 
another promise, and” assuming that he can think in general terms, we are thereby 
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leading him to “apprehend prima facie rightness to belong to the nature of any fulfillment 
of promise (Ross 1930, p. 33).” 
 One further point Ross makes is salient here. The moral order expressed by these 
principles of prima facie duty is a necessary condition for there being any moral agent 
(1930, p. 29). One can then ask the dissenter when considering hypothetically a situation 
where he breaks a promise to see whether he thereby recognizes himself as diminished as 
a moral being. Of course, it is logically possible that the dissenter will reply that such 
exercises lead him to no recognition of prima facie duty or to the diminishment of one’s 
moral being upon violating such alleged principles. At this point, we have arrived at what 
Douglas Walton calls the maieutic closure of dialogue. I do not believe it follows from 
this development that one has to retract one’s acceptance of these prima facie warrants or 
their self-evidence, but that raises issues beyond the scope of this paper. 
 What may we say then of overriding warrants, those licencing us to hold that 
some evaluative property holds outright and not just prima facie. Arguments to a 
conclusion that an act is right simpliciter may proceed from premises attributing positive 
prima facie right-making characteristics to that act. The warrant then would be of the 
form 
 
Given that  x is R1, ..., Rn 
One may take it that x is right 
 
where n $ 1. In (1930), Ross raises serious questions about whether arguments of this 
form could ever be cogent. 
 
No act is ever, in virtue of falling under some general description, necessarily actually 
right; its rightness depends on its whole nature and not on any element in it.... Right acts 
can be distinguished from wrong acts only as being those which, of all those possible for 
the agent in the circumstances, have the greatest balance of prima facie rightness, in those 
respects in which they are prima facie right, over their prima facie wrongness, in those 
respects in which they are prima facie wrong (pp. 33, 41). 
 
There are some general rules of thumb, principles for weighing these respects. Duties of 
perfect obligation will ordinarily take precedence over other duties. But apart from these 
rules, the judgment that a particular act is right or a duty simpliciter is a judgment of our 
moral sense, “this sense of our particular duty in particular circumstances, preceded and 
informed by the fullest reflection we can bestow on the act in all its bearings (Ross 1930, 
p. 42).” Proper arguments that an act is right simpliciter then will proceed from premises 
surveying both the prima facie right-making and wrong-making characteristics of the act. 
The warrant of the argument will be of the form 
 
Given that    x is R1, ..., Rn; (despite the fact that) 
x is W1, ..., Wm 
One may presumably take it that x is right 
 
Here for 1 # i # n, Ri is a prima facie right-making property and for 1 # j # m, Wj is a 
prima facie wrong-making property. 
 Whether one is confronted with a simpler argument from prima facie right-
making properties or a more fully considered argument from balance of prima facie right-
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making over wrong-making properties, one can accept the premises yet dissent from the 
conclusion first because one is aware of, i.e .has a justified belief that, the act satisfies 
some further prima facie wrong-making characteristic, Wm+1, which tips the balance of 
prima facie right-making over wrong-making characteristics in the opposite direction. 
The proponent’s survey of relevant characteristics has not been complete. Should the 
proponent agree that the act had characteristic Wm+1, in particular if the proponent has a 
justified belief that the act is Wm+1 or the dissenter is able to argue cogently that it is, then 
dissensus could be removed, provided that the proponent agreed that the act’s being Wm+1 
in addition to being W1, ..., Wm, tipped the balance against overall rightness. The 
proponent could still disagree, holding his original conclusion however, for one of two 
reasons. It is most efficient to consider the first in conjunction with the next ground of 
dissent for the challenger. 
 The challenger could dissent from the conclusion not because she apprehended 
that the act did in fact possess Wm+1 but that there was no presumption that it did not. 
That is, the burden of proof falls on the proponent to show that it does not and the 
proponent has not discharged that burden of proof. This point can perhaps be clarified 
through several concepts from Rescher’s account of formal dialectics in (1977). In an 
exchange, a proponent and challenger argue a case before a determiner. The proponent, 
and only the proponent, may make categorical assertions of the sort “P is the case,” in 
symbols !P. The challenger, and only the challenger, may make cautious assertions of the 
sort “P is the case for all you have shown,” in symbols †P. ‘†~ P” then in effect is a 
request by the challenger for the proponent to justify P. By making this cautious 
assertion, she is claiming that the burden of proof is on the proponent to show that P. 
Without such an argument, there is no presumption for P. Unlike categorical and cautious 
assertions, both proponent and challenger may make provisoed assertions, “P standardly 
obtains provided that Q,” in symbols P/Q.  (See Rescher 1977, p. 6.) These assertions are 
metalinguistic, ‘P/Q’ being akin to ‘Q | P,’ an explicit assertion of a warrant in 
Toulmin’s sense, but a warrant authorizing a tentative step from data to claim. Such are 
the warrants in the arguments we are considering here. Where a is the act the proponent is 
arguing is right simpliciter, he has implicitly asserted 
 
Ra / R1a & ... & Rna & W1a & ... & Wma 
 
To this assertion, the challenger may pose 
 
~Ra / (R1a & ... & Rna & W1a & ... & Wma & Wm+1a) & †(R1a & ... & Rna & W1a 
& ... & Wma & Wm+1a) 
 
(Compare Rescher 1977, p. 12.) Should the challenger concede (R1a & ... & Rna & W1a & 
... & Wma), she is then cautiously asserting Wm+1a, i.e. †Wm+1a, i.e. that there is no 
presumption for ~Wm+1a. 
 As Rescher points out (1977, p. 15), there are two ways the proponent may reply 
to the challenger here, by attacking either the provisoed assertion or the cautious 
assertion. There are in turn two ways to attack the cautious assertion, first by making a 
categorical counterassertion !~((R1a & ... & Rna & W1a & ... & Wma & Wm+1a). Since the 
proponent already categorically asserts R1a & ... & Rna & W1a & ... & Wma, this move 
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implies the proponent asserts !Wm+1a. By contrast, he may seek to argue for this claim by 
making a provisoed counterassertion together with a further categorical assertion: 
 
~(R1a & ... & Rna & W1a & ... & Wma & Wm+1a) / Sa & ! Sa 
 
Again, given his categorical assertion of R1a & ... & Rna & W1a & ... & Wma, this entails 
 
~Wm+1a / Sa & ! Sa 
 
 The proponent may rather counter the provisoed assertion 
 
~Ra / R1a & ... & Rna & W1a & ... & Wma & Wm+1a 
 
by drawing a strong distinction (See Rescher 1977, p. 15.): 
 
Ra / (R1a & ... & Rna & W1a & ... & Wma & Wm+1a & Sa) & ! (R1a & ... & Rna & 
W1a & ... & Wma & Wm+1a & Sa) 
 
The proponent is conceding the rebutting condition Wm+1a but claiming that its force to 
rebut the argument from R1a & ... & Rna & W1a & ... & Wma to Ra is in turn undercut, 
rebutted by Sa. Clearly, the proponent can use this reply of a strong distinction whether 
the challenger has merely cautiously asserted that Wm+1a or whether Wm+1a is an 
established fact or justified statement. 
 Each of these moves by the proponent has the potential to resolve dissensus. 
Should the proponent simply assert !~Wm+1a, he trust that his categorical assertion of 
~Wm+1a will establish a presumption for the claim. This need not be unreasonable, should 
~Wm+1a be a report of personal testimony or a statement of expert opinion, where there is 
a presumption that the proponent is a duly qualified expert. By contrast, should the 
challenger accept ~Wm+1a (and its implications for the argument to Ra) upon the 
proponent’s asserting ~Wm+1a / Sa & !Sa, he would have removed dissensus through 
argument, which likewise obtains should the challenger accept the proponent’s strong 
distinction. Viewed from the perspective of the Toulmin model, †Wm+1a constitutes a 
rebuttal, the proponent’s countermoves here constituting counterrebuttals.3 
 In light of these methods of counterrebuttal, we can see how even in the light of 
the proponent’s asserting Wm+1a or mooting its possibility, the proponent need not 
concede ~Ra and has recourse through extending his argumentation to resolve the 
dissensus with the challenger. This does not mean that the proponent will resort to such 
argumentation to convince the challenger. Even if he accepted that a has this further 
prima facie wrong-making characteristic Wm+1, he could hold that this additional fact 
does not tip the balance of considerations against Ra. This would seem to indicate a more 
intractable level of disagreement between proponent and challenger, for the judgment that 
Wm+1a does or does not tip the balance of prima facie right-making versus wrong-making 
considerations against Ra is a judgment of moral sense. Do proponent and challenger 
simply have a different sensibility here and we must leave their dissensus at that? I do not 
                                                 
3 For our account of counterrebuttals as elements in arguments, see our (1991, pp. 161-65). 
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believe so, because I suspect that in such a situation upon reflection proponent and 
challenger will recognize that they disagree over what prima facie right-making and 
wrong-making features are true of the act a. They both agree that 
 
R1a & ... & Rna & W1a & ... & Wma & Wm+1a 
 
but on reflection the proponent may see he regards further right-making or the challenger 
further wrong-making characteristics that a possesses. But this brings us to the issue of 
interpretation, the topic of the next section. 
 
3. RESOLVING DIFFERENCE OVER INTERPRETATIONS-POSSIBLE STRATEGIES 
 
When two persons, or two groups or cultures, disagree over some moral or evaluative 
issue, how likely is it that their disagreement results from a difference in moral sense or a 
difference in their apprehension of the moral or evaluatively relevant properties upon 
which they see the value supervening? I believe that in most cases, the latter hypothesis 
better explains the moral dissensus. Certainly it is pragmatically more fruitful. If the 
moral sense generates basic moral or evaluative beliefs, then it would seem that two 
persons who apprehend exactly the same evaluatively relevant features in a given 
situation, should they disagree over its value, have little or no way of resolving that 
disagreement. Indeed such disagreement’s being the norm would constitute reason for 
saying that value judgments are subjective, matters of taste, not open to rational scrutiny. 
But if we found that when two persons’ evaluative judgments of a situation differ, their 
apprehension of the properties of the situation differ, then we have a potential strategy for 
resolving the disagreement: Bring about agreement over the evaluatively relevant 
properties of the situation. 
 For example, suppose John sees sexual relations between persons of the same 
gender as expressions–to be analyzed in terms of some combination of psychological 
dispositions and conscious intentions–of an attraction between the two persons analogous 
to attractions persons of the opposite gender may feel toward each other. If expressions of 
the latter are morally acceptable, at least in some cases, the former are acceptable in 
analogous cases. This is a matter of simple justice, of treating like cases like. By contrast, 
suppose Jim sees sexual relations between persons of the same gender undertaken in the 
absence of a general consensus over their acceptability as a willful and hubristic defiance 
of the norms which have constituted the meaning of sexual relations, membership in the 
moral community, and indeed union with the One who called that community into being. 
Would it be any wonder that John and Jim would disagree over the moral rightness of 
such relations? But their divergence of views stems from ascribing radically different 
psychological dispositions and intentions to those engaging in such relations, i.e. to 
radically different interpretations of the situation.4 
                                                 
4 These considerations form at least the beginning of a reply to the moral relativist. People in different 
cultures may learn different interpretative principles and thus will interpret situations differently. Given 
differing interpretations, one would expect different evaluations. But the interpretations themselves, 
although evaluatively relevant, are not in general themselves value judgments. (One exception would be 
judgments of intrinsic value upon which judgments of deontic value supervene.) To apprehend a state of 
affairs as causing certain satisfactions, a person as a member of a community to which duties may be owed, 
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 How then might one resolve differences over interpretation? The first step 
obviously is to recognize the difference. This in itself may mark a distinct affective, if not 
conceptual, advance toward resolution of the dissensus. If Jim believes that a certain act 
is wrong, the wrongness supervening on a certain balance of prima facie wrong-making 
over right-making characteristics, yet John believes the act right, its rightness 
supervening on the balance of a distinct set of prima facie right-making over wrong-
making characteristics, if Jim does not realize that John holds a distinct interpretation, he 
may regard John as being perverse for his different view. This is obviously not an attitude 
fostering progress and perseverance in dialogue. If one sees a person holding a different 
moral view upon holding a distinctly different interpretation, one might very well 
understand why the person holds the contrasting moral view and not judge him negatively 
for doing so. 
 Can one move the dialogue beyond this affective reconciliation? Two strategies 
seem possible. The first reminds us of the aphorism that sometimes “It is not either or, 
but both and.” Assuming for the sake of discussion that there is a presumption for both 
John and Jim’s interpretations, can the two be consistently united (or united with minimal 
revision)? The hope is that if John and Jim came to hold the same overall interpretation of 
the situation, and the questions whether an act was overridingly right or wrong depended 
on one’s moral sense of the balance of prima facie right making versus wrong making 
properties of the act in that situation, John and Jim might very well come to that same 
judgment regarding the rightness or wrongness of the act. The question of whether or not 
the interpretations can be combined is logical. If of an act a, John believes 
 
RN1a & ... & RNna & WN1a & ... & WNma  
 
while Jim believes 
 
RO1a & ... & ROja & WO1a & ... & WOka 
 
is {RN1a, ... RNna , WN1a , ..., WNma, RO1a , ..., ROja, WO1a , ..., WOka} logically 
consistent? Can a minimally revised set be constructed which is logically consistent? We 
are skeptical that such a consistent union is in general possible. Can one and the same act 
be at once the expression of natural affection and at the same time a hubristic defiance of 
the rational moral law of the universe? Whether or not such a conjunction involves an 
outright contradiction depends on the analysis of the terms involved. Even if it does not, 
it certainly involves a tension amounting to a practical contradiction. Hence, we expect 
this strategy is distinctly limited. 
 But there is a second strategy: Evaluate the contrasting interpretations for 
acceptability. Are the interpretations and interpretive principles involved in forming them 
justified? In providing a framework to answer these questions, argumentation theory can 
make a distinct contribution towards resolving moral dissensus or at least indicating in a 
given case whether moral dissensus can be resolved. Let us assume, this time also for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
or a behavior as manifesting certain dispositions is not to render a value judgment. A suitable defense of the 
thesis that divergence in value judgments stems from divergence in interpretation would shift the burden of 
proof to the relativist to show that nonetheless values are just culturally conditioned. We have discussed 
these issues in some detail with respect to aretaic judgments in (2005, pp. 271-75). 
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same of discussion, that should proponent and challenger both be able to make clear the 
conjunction of evaluatively positively and negatively relevant factors on which they 
claim their opposed evaluations supervene, that both would agree with each other’s 
judgment of supervenience. In terms of (prima facie) connection adequacy, both are 
willing to grant the other’s argument. The disagreement then will be over the premises 
from which they are arguing. Simply making clear what these premises are could be a 
step towards resolving moral dissensus. It in effect defines where the locus of 
disagreement or divergence lines. Where a is the thing over which proponent and 
challenger disagree, Pi represents a feature relevant to a positive evaluaiton, Nj a feature 
relevant to a negative evaluation, PEa expresses a positive evaluation of a and NEa a 
negative evaluation, using Govier’s method of diagramming conductive arguments with 
counterconsiderations (See 2005, p. 396), we may represent the contrasting positions of 
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CHALLENGER: 
  
Since the proponent sees PN1a, ..., PNna as the features on which the positive evaluation 
supervenes, they are his premises. The same holds mutatis mutandis of the challenger. 
We may construe NN1a, ..., NNma as rebutting conditions which the proponent counters by 
admitting them but claiming their force is neutralized in this case by the greater weight of 
the premises. i.e. by the fact that the premises also hold. Hence, we may also diagram the 
proponent’s argument according to the scheme we presented in (1991, pp. 163-65): 
11 
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The point we want to emphasize is that for the proponent’s argument, the issue of 
premise acceptability concerns PN1a, ..., PNna, and for the challenger NO1a & ... & NOja . 
We shall discuss just the proponent’s case. What we say may be applied, mutatis 
mutandis, to the challenger. 
 In (2005), we presented a procedure of epistemic casuistry for determining the 
acceptability of basic, i.e. undefended premises.5 In general, not all the premises in {PN1a, 
..., PNna} will be basic or should be treated as basic in assessing their acceptability. For 
example, if PiNa asserts some dispositional property of a, simple perceptual observation 
                                                 
5 Basic premises are not defended in the context of the argument in which they occur. This does not mean 
they cannot be defended by argument. 
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may not be sufficient to justify accepting this statement. Since proponent and challenger 
are interpreting the situation differently and the proponent holds that PiNa on the basis of 
how he has interpreted other features of the situation, should we be able to identify those 
features and the interpretive principles they proponent has used, we have materials 
available for an argument for PiNa. In evaluating acceptability, we should not then regard 
PiNa as basic. This means that we must adapt our casuistical procedure as presented in 
(2005). 
 Whether PiNa should be taken as basic or not, the first question we should ask is 
what type of statement is PiNa. We may distinguish four basic types of statements: 
descriptions, interpretations, evaluations, and necessary statements. It does not seem 
meaningful to say that an evaluative property supervenes over a necessary property. 
Some evaluative properties may supervene over other evaluative properties. For example, 
Ross counts virtue as a primary intrinsic good (1930, p. 140). The virtuousness of an 
action, i.e. its aretaic value, supervenes upon its motivation. But insofar as the action is a 
virtue, it is also intrinsically good. That some acts are duties supervenes upon their 
instrumental value, that they are productive of some intrinsic good. Specifically, Ross 
sees duties of beneficence supervening on the act’s increasing the virtue, intelligence, or 
pleasure of some other being. (See 1930, p. 21.) But clearly, we need not worry about an 
infinite regress here. The aretaic value of an action supervenes upon its type of 
motivation, an interpretive property of the action. That certain acts produce intrinsically 
good states of affairs is likewise an interpretive property of the acts. 
 Now proponent and challenger could certainly disagree over whether an action 
proceeded from a certain motivation or whether an act produced a positive balance of 
prima facie intrinsic good over prima facie intrinsic bad. But, as we have already noted, 
they would not disagree over what states of affairs were prima facie intrinsically good or 
bad nor, we would expect, over what motivations virtue supervenes. Hence, cases of 
evaluative dissensus can be resolved into a finite number of component disagreements, 
where the proponent sees the positive evaluation of a supervening on properties PiN which 
are neither logically necessary nor evaluative. Pia then could be either a description, 
making an extensional claim such as a is occurrently angry, or an interpretation, making 
an intensional claim, such as a is dispositionally angry. The difference between 
descriptions and interpretqations concerns truth-conditions. Those for descriptions 
concern just the actual world. Those for interpretations concern both the actual and 
certain accessible possible worlds.6 
 Some descriptions are the objects of properly basic beliefs. They are neither 
justified nor need to be justified by other beliefs. A description stating a perceptual belief 
in the presence of clear perceptual evidence is a paradigm example. But not all 
descriptions need be properly basic beliefs or even basic beliefs. Some may be inferred, 
the warrant of the inference being some interpretive principle. For example, someone 
upon perceiving a van with its side seriously bashed in may come to believe that an 
accident has just occurred. That statement is a description, but one has come to believe it 
through interpretation, basically through inference to the best explanation. The person did 
not perceive the accident. Although as we have argued in (2005), some interpretations 
may be properly basic beliefs (See pp. 174-87.), since the truth-conditions for 
                                                 
6 For an elaboration of this distinction, see our (2005, pp. 104-105). 
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interpretations make reference to a framework of other possible worlds, recognizing that 
the proper truth-conditions hold is not a matter of simple perception. Hence, we would 
expect that frequently such statements would need justification through argument, an 
argument involving interpretive principles. Distinguishing descriptions from 
interpretations, then, is germane to the issue of premise acceptability and, in this case 
especially, to the issue of identifying what principles have led the proponent to his 
understanding of the situation. 
 These considerations on the basicality of descriptions versus interpretations lead 
directly to the next question to ask in determining premise acceptability–Is the premise 
basic or inferred? If basic, then we may employ the procedure of epistemic casuistry in 
(2005). We ask these further questions: 
 
What source, e.g. perception, introspection, personal testimony, common 
knowledge vouches for it? 
 Does the voucher create a presumption for the statement? 
 
Answering the second question in turn involves three further questions: 
 
a. Is the source presumptively reliable? 
b. Is the source epistemically compromised in this situation? 
c. Is the expected cost of mistakenly accepting the statement in this situation 
greater than the expected cost of procuring further evidence?7 
 
 That we are concerned here with resolving dissensus, however, raises a new point. 
As we discussed in (2005, pp. 134-37), following Thomas Reid (See Beanblossom and 
Lehrer, 1983, pp. 91-92.) we may distinguish original from acquired or learned 
perception. In original perception, some sensation understood as a purely mental event, is 
taken as a sign of some external object causing or occasioning that event. Suppose one is 
appeared to rose-scently. We perceive that the scent is caused. If experience of constant 
conjunction indicates that a particular object has the power to produce such a sensation, 
we come to perceive that object as the cause. But we do not perceive the cause as a rose. 
That requires further learning, perhaps through experience of co-variation of that 
sensation with other sensations indicating that co-variation of qualities or powers 
constituting the natural kind called rose, or through being told that this particular 
sensation is a sign of the natural kind rose. We learn then that a certain olfactory 
sensation is the scent of a rose. Perceiving a rose by smell then is a learned perception. 
As we discussed in (2005), our perceptual belief-generating mechanism involves an 
interpretive component, a set of interpretive principles open ended in the sense that it can 
always be augmented by further principles.8 
 Clearly, it is quite possible for proponent and challenger to acquire different sets 
                                                 
7 We discuss applying this procedure in detail in (2005) and cannot develop it further here. 
8 We may have original and acquired perception of physical and mental facts, and following Searle (1969, 
p. 51), acquired perception of institutional facts. For our discussion of these types of facts and types of 
perception, see (2005, pp. 133-35). 
14 
RESOLVING MORAL DISSENSUS: POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATION 
of interpretive principles. Hence, what would be a matter of acquired perception for the 
proponent need not be perceived at all by the opponent. Such divergence might not be 
surprising if proponent and challenger were from different cultures. For example, given 
his cultural background the proponent could have learned that persons in conversation 
need to maintain a certain physical distance from each other. Not to maintain this 
distance, to invade the other’s “body space,” could be taken as a sign of inappropriate 
forwardness or domination. The proponent then would perceive such forwardness in 
someone who failed to respect his body space. If the notion of body space is culturally 
foreign to the challenger, she may perceive no such forwardness. 
 In (2005, pp. 135-37), we argued that there is a presumption for acquired 
perception as there is for original perception. This does not mean that our acquired 
perceptual beliefs or the principles incorporated into the interpretive component of our 
perceptual mechanism cannot be mistaken. They are defeasible. But as long as there is a 
presumption that the interpretive principles have been reliably acquired, there is a 
presumption for them and for the perceptions they are involved in generating. 
Encountering a member of another culture who had not acquired this interpretive 
principle might serve to undercut this presumption, indicating that the proponent needs to 
defend or perhaps modify this interpretive principle. For example, cross-cultural 
disssensus between proponent and challenger concerning the behavior of someone from 
within the challenger’s culture might be removed by the proponent’s recognizing culture 
as a relevant variable and restricting his interpretive principle to exclude members of 
those cultures where there is no presumption that physical closeness is a sign of 
forwardness or intention to dominate. That such a revision could lead to resolution of 
moral dissensus is straightforward. Should the proponent have judged certain acts of 
some agent (not necessarily the challenger) as wrong supervenient upon these acts being 
expressions of a disrespectful fondness, no longer interpreting this agent’s acts of 
physical proximity as expressions of this attitude is no longer accepting the grounds upon 
which the negative evaluative judgment supervenes, and thus we would expect no longer 
accepting the judgment itself. 
 That defeasible interpretive principles may be involved in forming perceptual 
beliefs leads us directly to considering premises for evaluations which are not basic 
beliefs. Recall that in our schema, the proponent accepts some positive evaluation of 
some thing a, PEa, on the basis of premises PN1a, ..., PNna. He admits there are 
counterconsiderations but sees them as outweighed in this case by the premises. 
Resolving dissensus between proponent and challenger involves casting a critical eye on 
these premises, i.e. on their acceptability. If a premise is not basic, it is inferred from 
more basic premises, one of which may be an interpretive principle. Alternatively, the 
warrant of the inference may correspond to an interpretive principle. What may we say 
about the acceptability of such defended premises? Clearly, their acceptability depends 
on the cogency of the arguments to defend them. 
 Let’s assume first that the proponent has provided arguments for those premises 
which are not properly basic. Judgment whether the argument is cogent first involves 
assessing whether its premises are acceptable. (This in turn may involve appraising 
further arguments. However, since any argument is a finite structure, the process will 
terminate at some point.) Secondly, it involves determining connection adequacy. Are the 
premises relevant to the conclusion and do they constitute grounds adequate for accepting 
15 
JAMES B. FREEMAN 
it? As we have argued previously (See for example 1992.), to ask why the premises of an 
argument are relevant to its conclusion is to ask for the warrant of the argument, 
understood as the inference rule permitting one to infer conclusion from premises. In 
(2007), we argued that there are three types of nomic generalized conditionals which may 
correspond to a warrant–interpretive, evaluative, and logical. Hence there are three types 
of warrants. 
 An evaluative warrant would be a principle of supervenience. As we have already 
indicated, it is possible for our proponent to defend his main evaluative claim on the basis 
of some further evaluation, seeing that evaluation supervening upon some evaluatively 
relevant non-evaluative condition. His attempt to justify this evaluative claim by citing 
the condition involves an evaluative warrant in his argumentation. But we have already 
discussed the issues involved with resolving dissensus over evaluative warrants in section 
two. This leaves two other possibilities for the warrant–a priori and interpretive. 
 It is logically possible, although we expect unlikely, that the warrant is a priori. 
Such a warrant would correspond to a universally generalized conditional asserting a 
necessary connection, be it of formal logical necessity, e.g. 
 
(œx)([Ux & (Ax & Mx)] e Ux), 
 
semantic necessity, e.g. 
 
All bachelors are unmarried, 
 
or broadly logical necessity of some further type.9 The question of connection adequacy 
then is the question of whether this warrant is a valid principle of inference, for which 
formal techniques or semantic or other considerations provide the appropriate method for 
resolving dissensus. By contrast, we think it likely that the warrant is an interpretive 
principle. As we may distinguish three types of explanations–physical, personal, and 
institutional, so we may distinguish physical, personal, and institutional warrants.10 As a 
physical explanation seeks to account for some event or phenomenon in the physical 
world in terms of some antecedent physical event or phenomenon and a nomic covering 
generalization, a physical warrant will draw some inferential moral from that covering 
generalization. Clearly, this may include both inferences from a cause and inferences to a 
cause. 
 Personal explanations include psychological explanations in terms of the motives 
of some agent or the agent’s reasons or conscious intentions. Contrast 
 





                                                 
9 In (2005), we distinguish five types of necessary statements, see pp. 114-17. 
10 We discuss many issues closely related to this distinction in detail in (2005, Chapter 8). 
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Joe’s forcing the sale of the company expressed his choice to use his business 
partners as mere means to increase his own wealth. 
 
Institutional explanations appeal to some generalization, which may be defeasible, 
included in or derived from the constitutive rules of some institution. Following Searle 
(1969), we understand institutions as systems of constitutive rules, which “do not merely 
regulate, [but] create or define new forms of behavior (1969, p. 33).” Paradigm examples 
are rules defining moves in a game or legal rules defining conditions of ownership or 
citizenship. One could not strike out in baseball unless there were rules defining the 
conditions for striking out. One could not claim property rights unless there were rules 
defining the institution of property. 
  The issue of whether the premises and conclusion of an argument employing a 
physical, personal, or institutional warrant are properly connected to justify accepting the 
conclusion given that the premises are acceptable is a matter of how the warrant is 
backed, whether in the case of the particular argument being evaluated certain rebutting 
conditions also hold, and the level of proof (e.g. balance of evidence, beyond a 
reasonable doubt) required in the context of the argument. Physical, personal, and 
institutional warrants will be backed differently. Ideally, physical warrants will be backed 
by data generated through a series of canonical tests as Cohen describes in (1977, pp. 
128-33) and (1989, pp. 145-56). Personal warrants may be backed by observations of 
behavior or by empathetically entering into the situation of an agent satisfying certain 
conditions. An institutional warrant would be backed by the constitutive rules themselves 
of which the warrant was an inferential moral. The issues involved in determining proper 
backing in these cases are beyond the scope of this paper.11 
 Rather, we emphasize here that the issues of backing and rebuttal open the 
possibilities for continuing the dialogue between proponent and challenger, with the 
attendant opportunity of resolving dissensus. If the challenger questions why some 
condition upon which the proponent sees his value judgment supervening holds, the 
proponent can present an argument for it. Finding the argument still not cogent, the 
challenger can ask for the warrant of the argument, explore the extent of its backing, and 
the question of its being rebutted. Through all these cases, the proponent may be able 
ultimately to satisfy the challenger. Alternatively, the proponent may become aware at 
some point that he cannot make his case satisfactorily and revise or withdraw his 
viewpoint altogether. In both of these cases, argumentation has overcome moral 
dissensus. Of course, such a resolution cannot be guaranteed. 
 Why might proponent and challenger not reach consensus? Given their 
arguments, they still could disagree over the acceptability of a premise or the reliability of 
a warrant, given its backing and potential rebuttals. But even more fundamentally, they 
may continue to disagree over whether the features positively relevant to the evaluative 
property ascribed outweigh the negative features, or whether the negative features 
outweigh the positive. As we have indicated, once the premises and 
counterconsiderations are set out, judging which outweighs the other may be a matter of 
moral sense rendering a basic or immediate judgment. This is not always the case. As 
Ross points out, in some cases one may appeal to intuitions of greater stringency. “A 
                                                 
11 We have discussed some of these issues in (1992), (2006), and (2007). 
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great deal of stringency belongs to the duties of ‘perfect obligation’–the duties of keeping 
our promises, of repaying wrongs we have done, and of returning the equivalent of 
services we have received (1930, pp. 41-42).” Apropos of the dissensus between John 
and Jim, we might say that if an act of a certain sort would constitute an affront to the 
moral sentiments of some others, even though one believes one is within one’s rights to 
perform such acts, one has a duty to refrain. One’s prima facie duty of non-malfeasance 
outweighs one’s right in this case. But even in the light of various considerations of 
precedence, dissensus may continue. Disagreement remains, although hopefully the 
dialogue has clarified the issues over which there is disagreement. 
 One might hope that clarification in some instances would resolve disagreement 
by disclosing the vagueness or ambiguity of the terms in which dissensus has been cast. 
Since problems of meaning are part of the standard curriculum of informal logic, here is 
another place for argumentation theory to contribute to resolving moral dissensus. If the 
proponent clarifies the characteristics over which he sees some evaluation supervening 
and the challenger likewise given an account of the characteristics over which she sees 
the opposite evaluation supervening, proponent and challenger may realize that they do 
not disagree at all or their disagreement may be far less than supposed. But again, this 
happy outcome is not guaranteed. The disagreement may be too deep. 
 
4. THE MORAL OF OUR STORY ON RESOLVING MORAL DISSENSUS 
 
Although not all cases of moral dissensus may be resolvable, we hope that in this paper 
we have indicated how the problem may be more tractable than one might at first think. 
Identifying the conditions on which the rightness or an act judged right is intuitied to 
supervene or similarly the conditions over which the goodness of a good state of affairs is 
claimed to supervene clarifies the issues over which there is disagreement. In some cases, 
it may even show that there is not disagreement. If proponent and challenger were to 
“see” the act or state of affairs as the other saw it, they might not disagree over whether 
from that perspective the evaluation is correct. They might still disagree over whether 
one or more of these evaluatively relevant properties hold. But in that case, they can, 
given the resources of argumentation theory, construct an argument that the property does 
hold and proceed to evaluate that argument for cogency. Surely this exercise has 
potential, in a number of cases, to resolve disagreement over whether the evaluatively 
relevant property holds, which might in turn resolve moral dissensus. 
 Should proponent and challenger agree over the evaluatively relevant properties 
actually holding in a given case, the question of whether the positively relevant properties 
outweigh the negatively relevant properties again offers promise of resolving dissensus 
by focusing the discussion. It would seem that only when two persons might agree on the 
evaluatively relevant properties, both positive and negative, holding in a given situation 
but not agree over whether one set of conditions outweighs the other, that dissensus might 
be intractable. But in how many cases will this happen and can one be sure that no further 
evaluatively relevant considerations can be brought forward? Deep disagreement is a 
possibility in some cases, but let us not concede it until we see how argumentation can 
play a role in resolving the moral dissensus. 
 
link to commentary 
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